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WHYARE THERE SO FEW BLACK
ENTREPRENEURS?
ABSTRACT
Blackentrepreneurship has been unsuccessful in the U.S. The
fraction of employed blacks that work in their own businesses is
about one—third that of whites. Other measures of success such as
net income, number of employees, and form of organization show
large differences between blacks and whites. This paper examines
explanations for these differences, particularly focusing on the
frequently cited economic explanations of liquidity constraints
and consumer discrimination. Liquidity constraints are examined
by estimating logit equations for who is self—employed in a
cross-section and who becomes self-employed in a panel. These
estimates suggest that net worth is not an important determinant
of the racial differences in self-employment. An examination of
small business starting capital indicates that little capital is
needed to start most business and beginning entrepreneurs do not
usually borrow. Examining the industrial distribution of black
and white businesses, I do not find a greater relative
representation of blacks in industries requiring less starting
capital. I also examine if black businesses are relatively more
common in industries where white customers more frequently
patronize black businesses. Little support is found for this
hypothesis. I conclude that cultural differences may explain







Black entrepreneurship has not been successful in the United States. The 1980 Census
indicated that 13.3 percent of employed white males worked in their own businesses, while 4.3
percent of black males did. Net income for black owned businesses is on average 35percentof that
of white male businesses. There are also enormous differences between black and white businesses
in mean receipts and the number of employees.
These differences should be a source of concern for several reasons. First, self.employment
has been frequently proposed as a route Out of poverty and is currently being promoted by many
states and the federal government as a way to leave the welfare and unemployment insurance rolls.
Second, it is often argued that self-employment provides a safety valve for those who are unable to
obtain jobs elsewhere, due to discrimination, high unemployment, or other reasons. Third, small
businesses are often perceived as a source of dynamism and growth in the economy. It is frequently
argued that small businesses create a disproportionate share of new jobs and innovations.' Fourth,
small business owners have an important affect on political decisions in the U.S.2 The lack of black
businesses means greater inequality in political power. Furthermore, the dearth of black businesses
is behind the tensions between groups of blacks and ethnic Store owners in many cities.
This paper begins by documenting the vast differences between blacks and whites in the
number and earnings of entrepreneurs. The differences in self-employment rates are shown to be
large using several independent data sources. I show that measures of success such as number of
employees and business receipts are also very different for blacks and whites. I then examine
explanations for these differences, focusing on the frequently cited economic explanations of liquidity
constraints and consumer discrimination. Liquidity constraints are examined by estimating logit
equations for who is self-employed in a cross-section and who becomes self-employed in a paneL
These estimates suggest that net worth is not an important determinant of the racial differences in
self-employment. Little capital is needed to start most business and beginning entrepreneurs do not
usually borrow. Additionally, the industrial distribution of black and white businesses does not
'Brown et at. (1990) provides a critical analysis of the evidence.
2See Brown et at. (1990).2
indicate a greater relative representation of blacks in industries requiring less starting capital.
Consumer discrimination can also be examined using the industrial distribution of black and white
businesses.I examine if black businesses are relatively more common in industries where white
customers more frequently patronize black businesses. Little support is found for this hypothesis.
I conclude that cultural differences may explain black/white differences in self-employment, but this
explanation requires further study.
2. Liquidity Constraints
Numerous authors have argued that low black assets and discrimination in lending have been
responsible for low black self-employment rates.3 Blacks on average have very low assets relative
to whites. Blau and Graham (1990) report that studies comparing the two groups find black/white
asset ratios of .08 to .19. Their own unadjusted ratio for households with a primary respondent age
24 to 34 in 1976 or 1978 is .18. These black/white ratios are strikingly low and suggest that the
liquidity constraints hypothesis needs further investigation.
Several authors have emphasized the role of an individual's assets in the decision to become self-
employed. Examples are Evans and Jovanovic (1989), Evans and Leighton (1989) and Blanchflower
and Oswald (1990). It has also been argued that limited access to credit has prevented minorities
3Examples are Bates (1985a), Chen and Cole (1988) and Small Business Administration
(1988).
41n the Survey of Income and Program Participation data, which include detailed questions
about several dozen categories of assets and debts, I find a ratio of .21 for those households with
head age 24 to 34. For all households I find .26, a ratio which tends to rise with age (across
cohorts) at least until age 65.
5Blanchflower and Oswald (1990), which analyzes British data, is particularly interesting for
two reasons. First, their measure of assets is gifts and inheritances so it is arguably exogenous to
the decision to enter self-employment. Second, they find an effect of assets that is quantitatively
large as well as being statistically significant.3
from starting businesses. An example of the small literature on lending discrimination and minority
businesses is Ando (1988).6
Alternatively, Light (1972), Sowell (1981), and others argue that lending by formal institutions
is not very important in the establishment of small businesses. They argue that people usually do not
borrow to set up a business, and when they do, they mainly borrow from friends and relatives. Sowell
argues that the degree of cohesion within a community will affect the ability to borrow. The lender
needs to know that the borrower is worthy of credit (and maybe also be able to monitor the
borrower'a effort).
3. Theories of Consumer Discrimination
Many people have argued that low black self.employment rates are due to consumer
discrimination, while others have suggested that consumer discrimination might be important, but have
not necessarily endorsed the view that it is a primary cause.7 Consumer discrimination models have
characterized some whites as being only willing to purchase a product from some blacks at a price
lower than they would pay whites. Becker (1971) suggests that this type of consumer discrimination
is likely to be important in retailing and the professions. He also argues that it is likely to be more
important in jobs where there is substantial contact between blacks and whites.
In his survey, Cain (1986) argues that consumer discrimination is not important in explaining
black/white earnings differences because blacks could easily find employment in jobs where there is
little contact with consumers. This argument seems to be right for discrimination against wage and
salary workers. However, the vast majority of the self.employed are sole proprietors who necessarily
have substantial contact with customers. Thus, consumer discrimination might have a great effect on
6Ando (1988) finds that black men in her sample have a 12.8 percent lower loan acceptance
rate, and black women have a 15.5 percent lower loan acceptance rate than nonminority men.
However, this evidence is weak because the sample is small and highly unrepresentative. The
data come from a sample which had a cumulative nonresponse rate (through two stages) of 97
percent.
7See Moore (1983), Chen and Cole (1988), and Borjas and Bronars (1989).4
theself-employed exactly for the reason it may have little effect on wage earners. One might expect
consumer discrimination to be more important in industries where it is difficult to verify the quality
of the product or service sold.Inthese industries it is likely that prejudiced individuals would not
obtain evidence to weaken their prejudices.
In a recent paper, Boijas and Bronars (1989) argue that the low black self-employment rate is
due to consumer discrimination. They claim that consumer discrimination will lead more able whites
and less able blacks to become self-employed. They argue that positive selection in an earnings
equation for the white self-employed and negative selection for the black self-employed is a test of
this hypotheses. The test is not completely convincing in that it depends on normal error terms and
the exclusion of variables measuring the local labor market conditions from the wage equation. The
test is also a general test of negative selection for blacks, rather than a test of consumer
discrimination per se.
Coate and Tennyson (1989) make an argument similar to Borjas and Bronars. They claim that
labor market discrimination can push lower ability minorities to find jobs as entrepreneurs. This
lower quality will be recognized by the credit markets which will raise the interest rate charged to
minorities when they borrow to start a business. They argue that in equilibrium, labor market
discrimination can reduce the self-employment rate of minorities. They point Out that their argument
can also hold if consumers recognize the lower quality of minorities entering self-employment and
lower the price they are willing to pay for their products.
On the other hand, many authors have argued that labor market discrimination will push those
discriminated against into self-employment where an individual's return would depend directly on his
or her ability. This argument is supported by anecdotal evidence about the history of Chinese and
Japanese immigrants to the U.S. in Light (1972).
tSee Light (1972), Sowell (1981), and Moore (1983). for example.5
4.Data sources
This paper primarily uses data from two sources: the 1984 Panel of the Survey of Income and
Program Participation (SIPP), and the 1982 Characteristics of Business Owners (CBO). The Survey
of Income and Program Participation is a longitudinal survey conducted by U. S. Bureau of the
Census. In the 1984 Panel, approximately 20.000 households9 (50,000 people of all ages in total)
were interviewed nine times over a three year period.'0 The multi-stage stratified sample was
selected to represent the noninstitutional population. The intervie took place between October
1983 and August 1986. Each interview asked about earnings and other income sources during the
previous four month period. Detailed information was given about the two wage and salary jobs and
two self employment jobs at which an individual worked the most hours during the survey period.
Two supplemental surveys provide detailed information about assets and liabilities. Questions are
asked about 20 types of assets and a dozen types of liabilities. The quality of the asset information
is one of the key reasons for using SIPP."
The 1982 Characteristics of Business Owners data combines information from the Surveys of
Minority-Owned Business Enterprises (SMOBE) and the Survey of Women-Owned Business (WOB)
with information from a mail survey. SMOBE and WOB are a combination of IRS and Social
Security Administration supplied information and Census Bureau Economic Census data. The IRS
provides the Census Bureau with the name, address and employer identification number of the firm;
social security numbers of the owners, partners or shareholders (up to 10 partners or shareholders
per firm); principal industrial activity code; dollar receipts; and legal form of organization. The IRS
does this for businesses filing forms 1040. Schedule C (sole proprietorships), 1065 (partnerships), or
1 120S (Subchapter S corporations). Using the social security number (SSN) from the IRS. the Social
Security Administration supplies the racial information filled out when the individual originally applied
for a SSN. Prior to 1981, applicants for a SSN would categorize their race as (a) white. (b) black.
Budget cuts reduced the sample by about 20% halfway through the sample period.
'°One.fourth of the sample was only interviewed 8 times.
"See U.S. Bureau of the Census (1986) for a description of the SIP? asset data.6
or (c) other. In 1981 the racial categories were expanded, but the Census Bureau used a mail canvas
to obtain information on groups other than whites and blacks. The Census Bureau Economic Census
files then provide the SIC code, geographic code, legal form of organization code, receipts, and
number of employees and annual payroll for firms with paid employees.
This SMOBE and WOB data is supplemented by a mail survey Sent to approximately 25,000
business owners in each of five panels: non-Hispanic white-male, black, women, Hispanic, and other
minority. The sample was stratified by state, snd 2-digit SIC. About eighty percent of those mailed
surveys responded)2 The survey was sent out in 1986 but asks questions about 1982. The survey
contains detailed questions about starting capital, sources of funds, the fraction of customers and
employees that are minorities, net income, length of ownership, age, sex, marital status, education,
work experience, and other matters. The data cover all industries except
agricultural production, railroads, and public administration. Businesses with sales less than $500, and
businesses with more than nine partners or shareholders are also excluded)3 The micro data from
the survey are not publicly available. The analysis below uses Special tabulations by 2-digit industry
done under contract by the Census Bureau.
5.StatisticalSummary of Black and White Self-Employment
SELF-EMPLOYMENT RATES
Blacks, other minorities and women all tend to have lower self-employment rates than white
males. Table 1 gives self-employment rates from the 1980 Census of Population for several racial and
ethnic groups, for both men and women. The self-employment rate is calculated as the fraction of
all those working who are self-employed. The numbers in this table include agricultural self-
employment.
'2See Nucci (1989), p. 12.
13See Nucci (1989).7
The black self-employment rate for males of 4.3 percent is less than ne-third that of whites
which is 13.3 percent. The number for black women is also about one-third the figure for white
women. Those of Spanish origin have self-employment rates about one-half the white rate, while
Asians have self-employment rates similar to those of whites, with Asian women being self-employed
at a higher rate than white women.
The numbers reported in Table 2, from the Surveys of Minority-Owned Business Enterprises and
the SurveyofWomen Owned Businesses, suggest an even worse picture for black and Hispanic
entrepreneurship.14 These numbers suggest that blacks are less than one-fourth as likely and
Hispanics are less than one-third as likely to be entrepreneurs as white males. Table 3 presents
analogous self-employment rates from the 1984 Panel of the Survey of Income and Program
Participation.15 The SIPP numbers are sample counts rather than population estimates. I have
excluded those working in agriculture and those not working full-time. An individual is classified as
self-employed if he or she worked a majority of hours in self-employment. Most full-time workers
had only self-employment hours or wage and salary hours and not both, as can be seen by the
relatively small number of side businesses reported in Table 3.
SELF-EMPLOYMENT EARNINGS
Not only are there proportionately fewer black owned businesses than white ones, but those
blacks who do become self-employed seem to fare worse than white entrepreneurs. This section
describes the earnings of black businesses, while later sections analyze other measures of business
success. Table 4 reports the number and mean net income before taxes of white-male, black and
Hispanic owned businesses for 1-digit SIC industries. These
t4The numerator of the self-employment rate is slightly different from that in Table 1 because
agricultural production is excluded, and the numbers are a count of businesses so they include
side businesses with receipts over $500.Thedenominator also excludes those in the armed
forces.
'These tabulations and all others below from SIPP exclude entirely imputed observations.8
comparisons unfortunately combine differences between blacks and whites and men and wnmen.
Even allowing for this, they suggest an enormous difference between the profits of black and white
owned businesses, and less of a difference between hispanic and white owned businesses. Black
businesses have net income about 35 percent of that of white-male owned businesses, while the
comparable figure for Hispanics is 66 percent. The ratios differ greatly across industries with
black/white ratios over 70 percent in construction and transportation and under 30percent in
agriculture, manufacturing, and wholesale trade.
Table 5providesseveral summary statistics for white, black, and Hispanic self-employment
earnings from SIPP. The exact measure of self-employment earnings used is given in the notes to
the table)6 Comparisons of self-employment earnings with wage and salary earnings are hindered
because comparisons tend to depend on what measure of central tendency is used. The comparisons
are different depending on whether one uses mean, mean of log, or median earnings)7 The SIPP
numberson log earnings suggest that black and Hispanic earnings are similar or slightly better than
those of whites in self-employment compared to relative earnings in wage and salary jobs. The
standard errors are large given the small number of minority entrepreneurs, so that few conclusions
can be drawn from the SIPP numbers. An analysis with the larger 1980 Census would be more
definitive.
EARNINGS REGRESSIONS
isAn economic definition of self-employment earnings would be net income minus the interest
rate times business equity plus the expected change in business equity. I have used the self-
employment draw earnings concept because net income was missing for almost half of the self-
employed. I did several tests for the data being missing at random, all of which failed. I plan to
adjust reported earnings to accord more closely with an economic definition of the return to self-
employment.
i7This points to the much greater dispersion of self-employment earnings thanwage and salary
earnings. In fact, calculating self-employment rates for each of the earnings deciles (self-
employment plus wage and salary earnings) for those working full-time in non-agricultural
industries yields startling results. The self-employment rate for the lowest decile is 23percent, the
rate is 20 percent in the top decile, and 6 percent in between.9
Table 6 reports several earnings equations for both wage and salary workers and the self-
employed. The self-employed seem to earn much less than wage earners, with the gap even larger
after controlling for individual characteristics. The self-employed tend to be older and more educated
so that regression controlled estimates suggest that self-employment earnings are even lower.
Compared to their wage earnings, blacks seem to do better in self-employment than whites, but the
difference is not significant. The analogous comparison for Hispanics does suggest higher self-
employment earnings relative to whites and the coefficient is significantly different from zero. Other
interesting coefficients include a significantly higher return to education in self-employment than in
wage and salary jobs,
OTHER MEASURES OF SUCCESS
Table 7 reports other measures of the success of white, black and Hispanic businesses. The data
indicate that black businesses have much lower receipts, fewer employees, and are less likely to be
incorporated or be partnerships. These numbers accord with the general view that black
entrepreneurship has not been very successful in the U.S.
6. SIPP Micro Data and LiquidityConstraints
Thissection analyzes data on individuals from the Survey of Income and Program
Participation (SIPP) and asks if differences in individual attributes can explain the black/white
differences in self-employment rates. Many authors have found that self-employed and wage and
salary workers tend to have differing characteristics. For example. the self-employed tend to be older
and more educated. This section examines whether these differences can explain the difference
between the black and white self-employment rates. The section particularly focuses on black/white
differences in net worth as an explanation for the differing self-employment rates.
Some suggestive evidence comes from the self-employment rates by net worth quartile. The
rates from lowest net worth quartile to highest are 5.2. 7.0, 8.6 and 16.8 percent. The percentage of
wage and salary workers in wave 4 who are self-employed one year later (wave 7) is from lowest to10
highest net worth quartile (wave 4) 1.8, 1.6, 1.7,and2.2 percent. While the cross-section self-
employment rates suggest a relationship between net worth and self-employment, it is not clear what
the causality is. The transition probabilities suggest that the relationship between net worth and
entering self-employment is less pronounced.
I begin by examining a cross-section of individuals from Wave 4 of the 1984 Panel of SIPP.'8
Table 8 reports estimates from several logit equations where the dependent variable is equal to one
if an individual is self-employed and zero if he or she is a wage and salary worker. The sample for
the analysis is all those working more than five hours/week; an individual is called self-employed if
a majority of his or her work hours are in self-employment. A number of demographic variables such
as age and education are included as well as measures of asset holdings. Assets are measured using
two variables, net worth and net worth interacted with a dummy variable for the top net worth
quartile. This specification is suggested by the self-employment rates by net worth quartile reported
earlier. Those numbers indicated that the self-employment rate differs only slightly between the
bottom three quartiles of the asset distribution, but rises dramatically in the top quartile. In most of
the specifications, net worth excluding business equity is used as the assets variable because business
equity is endogenous.
The estimates of Table 8 indicate that individuals who are more educated, older, married or
previously married, and with young children are more likely to be self-employed. Blacks are estimated
to be have a significantly lower self employment rate, and this coefficient is estimated precisely. The
coefficient can be used to calculate the derivative of the self-employment rate using the distribution
of explanatory variables in the sample. Using the estimates from specification (4),thiscalculation
implies that the black self-employment rate is 7.36 percentage points lower than the white rate even
after accounting for the other differences between blacks and whites. This estimated difference is
ttSince several dozen questions are asked about assets, for example. I only exclude
observations that are entirely imputed. If I exclude an observation because one asset item is
imputed, I lose 30.4 percent of the observations used below in the transition logit equations.
However, in this same sample. 97.2 percent of the observations have 3 or fewer imputed asset
items Out of 44 items.11
larger thantheunadjusted difference in racial self-employment rates. Hispanics also have a
significantlylower self-employment rate than whites. The asset variables are always significant. but
the black indicator variable falls only slightly with the inclusion of assets in the specifications.
Comparing specifications (2) and (3), one can see that the exclusion of business equity from net
worth changes the coefficient on net worth dramatically, but the black indicator variable changes only
slightly. These results suggest that differences in net worth do not explain the black/white self-
employment rate difference.
Another way to examine the importance of assets and other variables in explaining black/white
self-employment differences is to substitute the explanatory variables for one group in a logit equation
estimated on the other group.'9 For example, one can estimate a logit equation on the white
subsample and then calculate the mean predicted self-employment rate using the distribution of
explanatory variables from the black sample. This calculation can be thought of as an estimate of the
white self-employment rate if whites had the characteristics that blacks have, but their process
determining self-employment did not change. Mathematically, let the probability that individual i of
race jisself-employed estimated from a logit model be A(x,.,p1) = where
j=b for blacks and w for whites. Then the estimated white self-employment rate if they are given
black characteristics is IA(xbpW)/nb,wherebisthe black sample size. This calculation can be
thought of as performing the experiment of giving the black asset distribution as well as other
characteristics of blacks to the white population and calculating the resulting self-employment rate
assuming that the process generating white entrepreneurs does not change. If the resulting statistic
is close to the self-employment rate in the black sample then it suggests that most of the difference
between the black and white self-employment rates is due to differences in the characteristics of the
whites and blacks in the data. If the resulting statistic is close to the white self-employment rate, it
suggests that the process generating black entrepreneurs differs from that generating white
entrepreneurs.
This type of exercise is described extensively in Cain (1986). Here I have used the
distribution of explanatory variables for a racial group rather than the mean, as the two methods
will differ in a nonlinear model.12
The reverse calculation can also be performed and is equally valid.The statistic
can be interpreted as the predicted black self-employment rate if blacks are given the
characteristics that the sample of whites has, but the process generating blackentrepreneurs does not
change. Similarly, if this statistic is close to the white self-employment rate it suggests that most of
the differences in self-employment rates can be attributed to differences in the characteristics ofthe
white and black samples. If the statistic is far from the white rate itsuggests that whites and blacks
have different processes generating entrepreneurs.
Both sets of statistics for each of the first four specification are reported at the bottom of
Table 8 along with the raw self-employment rates in the sample for each race.Using specification
(3), the statistic with black characteristics indicates that about 31 percent of the blackjwhite difference
can be explained by individual characteristics. However, only 4 percent of the difference is explained
by net worth, which one can see by comparing speciOcations (1) and (3). The statistic using white
characteristics indicates that about 53 percent of the difference is due to individual characteristics,
with about 38 percent of the difference attributable to net worth differences. Thisapproach yields
conflicting results, because one method implies that assets explain little, while the other indicates they
explain about 38 percent of the difference between blacks and whites.2'
The derivative of the self-employment probability with respect to assets that is impliedby the
logit estimates is also very small. Using specification (3), the estimates imply that giving $100,000
(almost 1 1/2 times mean net worth excluding business equity) to each person would only raise the
self-employment rate by .69 percentage points.
ait has been argued that the reverse calculation is more appropriate becausepolicies to
change black characteristics are more plausible than policies to change white characteristics.
However, the choice is analogous to an index number problem so that both statistics areequally
valid in principle. One or the other calculation may be preferred because it has a smaller
sampling variance.
21The reason for this discrepancy is clear upon examination of the whiteonly and black only
specifications in columns (5) and (6) of Table 8. The white coefficient on net worth is negative.
while the black coefficient is large and positive. One might want to discount the resultsusing the
black net worth coefficient because the coefficient is not precisely estimated.13
TRANSITIONS TO SELF-EMPLOYMENT
There isa goodreason to notbase conclusions on the cross-sections described above.It is
likely that household asset holdings are endogenous. The cross-sectional correlations between self-
employment and assets found above may be an indication that the self-employed are more able to
accumulate assets rather than an indication that assets are crucial in enabling a person to become
self-employed. An approach which eliminates much of this endogeneity is the examination of
transitions into self-employment. Longitudinal analyses have the advantage of using past values of
individuals' characteristics such as assets to explain transitions. We can be more confident that past
values are a cause rather than a consequence of being self-employed. There still may be some
endogeneity of assets if a person saves to enter self-employment.
The logit equations are estimated over two time periods. Most of the analysis concentrates
on transitions between the end of 1984 and the end of 1985, a one year period The analysis is
repeated for a longer interval between the end of 1984 and the middle of 1986, a 20 month
transition.n The sample consists of those who are wage and salary earners in period t-l, and either
self-employed or wage and salary workers in period t? About 1.9 percent of wage and salary
workers are self-employed one year later. This percentage rises to 2.3 percent if one looks over the
longer 20 month period.
Tables 9 and 10 report estimates from a number of specifications of the logit transition
equations. The effects of most demographic variables in the transition equations is very similar to
their effects in the cross-sectional analysis. The more educated, older workers, males, and married
people are more likely to enter self-employment. A change from the cross-sectional results is that
young children decrease the transition rate and the effect of being previously married is smaller, but
am able to match 87.27 percent of the observations in Wave 4 to data in Wave 7.
A change in the rotation group pattern causes this to be a twenty month transition for
three-quarters of the sample, and a sixteen month transition for the last quarter of the sample.
'The sample analyzed is restricted to individuals who worked more than five hours per week
in both periods.14
theseeffectsare not pronounced. Again, blacks and Hispanics are estimated to have lower transition
rates.
Several different alternatives for the way net worth affects transitions are tried. These
specifications include net worth entered linearly, net worth with a different slope in the top net worth
quartile, net worth interacted with age, and net worth split into five asset categories. In none of
these approaches does net worth explain an appreciable fraction of the difference between the black
and white transition rates. The coefficient on the black indicator variable changes only slightly when
the different measures of net worth are included. In specification (3) of Table 9 the coefficient
implies that the black transition rate is 1.11 percentage points lower than the white rate after
accounting for net worth and other individual characteristics. This difference is exactly the same as
the comparison of mean transition rates without accounting for individual characteristics.
Again, an alternative way of measurtng the importance of net worth and other explanatory
variables is the calculation of the predicted transition rate for blacks when their characteristics are
substituted in the logit equations estimated using the white only sample. The reverse exercise cannot
be performed here with much confidence as the black sample is too small to estimate separate
coefficients precisely. Specification (1) of Table 9 indicates that 36 percent of the difference between
the black and white transition rates can be explained by a small set of demographic variables including
age, education, and marital status. Comparing specifications (1) and (3) one sees that the addition
of net worth only increases the explanatory power of individual characteristics to 39 percent. The
other specifications yield similar results. Again, differences in net worth do not appear to be an
important explanation for the self-employment differences.
The derivative of the transition rate with respect to net worth that is implied by the logit
estimates is also very small. Using specification (3). the estimates imply that giving $100,000(almost
1 1i2timesmean net worth excluding business equity) to each person would only raise the transition
rate by .00077.
Table10 reports some results on the importance of other variables in the transition rate logit
specifications. Specifications (5)and(6) suggest that those entering self-employment previously had
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low earnings but worked long hours. Specification (6) suggests that those that have previously
worked in a small business are more likely to start their own business. Not surprisingly, the
specification also indicates that union members and those who have held the same job for a long time
are unlikely to start a business.
INTERPRETING THE RESUL1'S
The interpretation of the reduced form transition equations raises several questions. Saving
to enter entrepreneurship might bias the coefficient on net worth upward. Consider a situation
where everyone is identical, except that some people save to enter self.employrnent. Then the net
worth coefficient will be positive in a transition equation, but by assumption everyone has the same
ability to accumulate assets and enter business. If people only borrow to enter self-employment, then
the asset coefficient will be zero, unless assets are used as a criteria for giving a loan. As will be
shown below, a majority of entrepreneurs do not borrow to begin their businessea. Thus the second
argument does not seem to be of great importance.
Additional evidence that may explain why net worth has little effect on self-employment
transitions comes from data on changes in household asset portfolios when entering self.employment.
The data indicate that most of these businesses have low equity and assets, and individuals do not
usually borrowed money to establish the business. I examine the portfolios of the 241 people who
are wage and salary workers in Wave 4 of the 1984 SIPP panel. and are self-employed one year later.
The 44th percentile of change in business equity upon entering self-employment is zero, the 71st
percentile is $10,000. The 44th percentile of the change in business value is zero, the 70th percentile
is $10000. The 72nd percentile of change in business debt is zero, the 85th percentile is $10,000.
BUSINESS FAILURES
The variables added in specification (6) are taken from Wave 3 and pertain to the main job
held during the four months previous to Wave 4. 1 have implicitly assumed that individuals held
the same job at that time. Because some observations did not match Wave 3, the sample size is
smaller in specification (6).16
I have concentrated above on the black white differences in transitions to self-employment.
The SIPP data indicate that blacks are only 43 percent as likely to transit to self-employmentas
whites, while the analogous level of black self-employment is 35percentof that of whites. This
suggests that while most of the difference in self-employment rates is due to a lower business
formation rate, part of the difference is due to a higher black business failure rate. This section
analyzes the determinants of exit from self-employment using several logit specifications.
Table 11 reports estimates from a logit model for exit from self-employment. The sample is
all those individuals who are wage and salary workers in Wave 4, but are self-employed oneyear later
in Wave 7. The dependent variable is 0 if an individual is still self-employed eight months
later in Wave 9, and 1 if the individual is not working or is a wage and salary worker in Wave 9.
These equations thus provide estimates of the short run failure rate for recently started businesses.
Specifications (1) and (2) classify an individual as wage and salary or self-employed on the
basis of where he or she worked the most hours. Specification (3) investigates if the results change
when one includes only those individuals who only have wage and salary hours in Wave 4 andonly
self-employment hours in Wave 7. In all of the specifications, most variables enter with the expected
signs, but the sample is too small to estimate the race variables with any precision. The results are
informative, however, on the issue of assets. The net worth coefficient is always small and
insignificant. The implied derivative from specification (1) indicates that giving $100000 in net worth
to each self-employed individual would only lower the failure rate from .307 to .300. Again. it does
not appear that assets play a central roll in the ability to be self-employed.
The sample size for the business failure logit equations is too small to be informative on racial
differences in failure rates, but the evidence from other studies suggests that the black failure rate
If one fits a first-order homogeneous Markov chain to the data by using the oneyear
transition rates for whites and blacks in Table 9, and the self-employment rates from Table 8, one
obtains an implied failure rate for whites of .173 and .232 for blacks.17
is similartothatof othergroups.V Thus, the evidence indicates that most of the difference in
black/white self-employmentratesis due to transitions to self-employment.
7. CBO Industry Data, LiquidityConstraints andConsumer Discrimination
In this section, I analyze the liquidity constraints and consumer discrimination hypotheses
using the Characteristics of Business Owners data. The data indicate that most businesses require
only a small amount of capital to open and that their owners rarely borrow. This confirms the lack
of importance of assets in the logit equations and the small changes in portfolios following entry into
self-employment found in Section 6. I also find that blacks are not overrepresented in industries that
require little starting capital or in those industries where whites frequently patronize black businesses.
AMOUNTS AND SOURCES OF CAPITAL
Table 12 reports the starting capital that was needed by the business owners in the CBO
sample. The exact question is:
What was the total amount of capital YOU needed to start or become an owner of this business?
Capital includes your own assets, money that was given to you, and money you borrowed?
The most striking thing about the numbers in Table 12 is that the amount of capital needed to start
a business tends to be small. 63 percent of nonminority males responding and 78 percent of blacks
responding indicated that they needed less than $5,000 to start their business. Note that this is the
starting capital of a Cross-section of existing firms, not a sample of entering firms. Thus, it will heavily
weight successful firms.
27Using the Survey of Minority-Owned Enterprises. Stevens (1984) finds that the failure rates
of black, Hispanic and Asian businesses differ only slightly over a five year period. Bates (1989)
examines the largest quarter of the CBO businesses and finds thai black owned firms had a
slightly higher failure rate.
The respondent chose from nine possible categorical responses such as None, $1-4,999,
S5,000-$9,999. etc.18
One might wonder how one can start a business with such small amounts of capital. However,
it seems plausible that a small-scale contractor would begin by renting equipment, an insurance
salesman would not need any capital, and a peddler would need little. One might argue that some
businessesmayneed cash over a long period of time. Presumably respondents would account for this
in their answers. Furthermore, a small businessman can use cash flow to finance further expansions
and it is unlikely that a business will need a lot of capital later just to operate if it needs little to
begin. Lastly, if black businesses are hindered by an inability to obtain subsequent capital, then they
should have a much higher failure rate which is not the case.
Despite beginning with little capital, these enterprises are worth studying. To be in the
sample, a business had to have at least $500 in receipts. If the CBO includes a large number of
marginal enterprises, then Its universe estimates should be much greater than those from other
sources. A comparison of the CBO number of businesses as reported in Table 2 to the number of
people in Table 1 or 3 that are primarily self-employed indicates that the CBO numbers are only
slightly larger than the Census estimates (which do not include side businesses) and are the same or
smaller than the SIPP estimates including side businesses. Furthermore, if these businesses are
marginal enterprises it is even more surprising that minorities are not overrepresented. Lastly, the
CBO responses on hours worked indicate that most of these businesses required a great deal of their
owners' time. 64 percent of the white-male business owners worked more than 30 hours/week in
their business and 72 percent worked more than 20 hours/week.
Table 12 reports the percentage of starting capital that was borrowed, and Table 13 reports
the sources of borrowed capital and equity capital. The numbers indicate that generally capital is not
needed or an individual uses his or her savings. Banks are not a key source of funds, and neither are
family members.19
SELF-EMPLOYMENT BY 2-DIGIT INDUSTRY
Table 14 reports the number of black and white-male owned businesses in each 2-digit SIC
industry, as well as the mean value of several characteristics within each industry. The percentage
of firms with less than $5000instartup capital comes from the "starting capital needed" question
described above. The percentage less than $5000waschosen rather than the mean because for many
industries at least one of the capital size categories was suppressed due to Census confidentiality
requirements. The percentage of firms needing less than $5,000 to start provides a measure of the
financial hurdle an individual faces when considering opening a business in the industry.
The columns for percentage of firms with primarily minority customers needs further
explanation. The CBO question asks "During 1982, what percentage of the customers served by your
business were White and NOT of Hispanic origin?" Seven different percentage ranges were given
as possible responses. Again, because many industries had the frequency of at least one possible
response suppressed due to Census confidentiality requirements, the percentage of firms that had at
least 50 percent minority customers was used as the summary statistic.
LIQUIDITY CONSTRAINTS
The liquidity constraints/low assets explanation for low black self-employment rates suggests
that there will be relatively more black businesses in industries where a large percentage of businesses
need less than $5.000 in initial capital. This suggests a positive slope to the relationship between the
ratio of the number of black businesses to the number of white-male businesses and the percentage
of black businesses with startup capital less than $5,000. Figure us a graph of this relationship for
1-digit SIC industries. A positive relationship is not evident in these points. Figure 2 is the
Missing values limit the sample to a subset of the SIC's in Table 10. All nonmissing values
are shown in the table.20
analogous graph for 2-digit SIC industries. Again, there does not appear to be any relationship. Since
Figure 2 is dominated by the outlier SIC 41, local and interurban passenger transit. Figure 3
reproduces the graph excluding SIC 41. Again, there does not appear to be a relationship between
the relative number of black businesses and the starting capital needed in that industry. Figures 4
and 5 are analogous to Figures 2 and 3. but they use the percentage of white-male owned businesses
that needed less than $5,000startingcapital. Again, there is no apparent positive slope that would
be predicted by the liquidity constraintsilow assets explanation for low black self-employment.
Regression estimates of the relationships in these graphs are in Table 15 and are discussed below.
A possible deficiency of this analysis is that starting capital may not include funds an individual
needs to support himself or herself while a business is being started. While, the opportunity cost of
time is presumably lower for blacks on average given lower wage and salary earnings, lower savings
might be an impediment not captured by starting capital requirements. A second difficulty is that a
2-digit SIC is an aggregation of many activities. For example, SIC 41, which is mainly taxicabs, has
a moderately high entry cost if one buys a car, but a fairly low one if one leases. In some cities the
cost of legal entry is high because of the expense of a taxicsb medallion, while in others it is
essentially free.
Additionally, the ability to use capital as collateral for sloan may differ across industries. This
problem is probably not very severe as most small businessmen are not entering specialized industries
where their capital could not be used as collateral.Lastly, the industry distribution of black
businesses is likely to be influenced by minority set-aside programs. However, the available
information on these programs is insufficient to determine if they have a profound effect on the
number of firms, and how the effect varies across industries.30
30See Bates (1985b) for a description of preferential treatment programs.21
CONSUMER DISCRIMINATION
This section provides evidenceon the plausibility of consumer discrimination as it is typically
formulated. I takeconsumer discrimination to mean that some whites are onlywillingto patronize
some black businesses if the price chargedbytheblackbusinesses is less than that of white
businesses. I also assume that this discrimination will be more pronounced in some industries than
in others. This difference could occur because the distaste whites have in shopping at black
businesses may depend on the type of business, because the type of contact will vary. Alternatively,
industries might differ in the ease with which the quality of the product can be verified. In those
industries where the quality is not easily verified, prejudice might be more likely to persist.
I measure the degree of consumer discrimination in an industry by the percentage of black
businesses that indicate that their customers are at least half minorities. If the black businesses have
mostly minority customers, I assume that whites are unwilling to shop there because of consumer
discrimination. I take this approach because it is difficult to objectively classify industries as to
whether or not there is a high degree of customer contact, whether the customer contact is
objectionable to someone discriminating, and whether it is difficult to verify the quality of the
product. Therefore, I have used the degree to which the business attracts white customers as an
objective measure of consumer discrimination.
Figures 6 througn 9 plot the blackiwhite-male ratio of the number of businesses against the
percentage of black businesses that indicate that their customers are at least half minorities.
Consumer discrimination implies a negative relationship between these two variables.If black
customers also discriminate against black business owners, or black businesses are able to cater to
black tastes better (clientele effects) then one might not expect to see the hypothesized relationship.
Figure 6 is the 1-digit industry graph, while Figures 7 and 8 display the 2-digit relationship with and
without SIC 41 (tadcabs). None of these graphs show the negative relationship predicted byconsumer discnmination. For comparison, Figure 9 graphs the black/white-male number of business
ratio against the percentage of white-male businesses with primarily minority customers.
One might be concerned that the primarily minority customers variablestrongly reflects
geographic location. Most of the industries examined are retail or service industries and are local
businesses. If these black businesses are unable or unwilling to locate near whiteneighborhoods then
it suggests that they feel they will not find white patrons. If they are only able caterto blacks, then
the consumer discrimination hypothesis implies that their market would be limited andthey would
not prosper.
Table 15 reports a series of regressions which test the visual impressions of thefigures using
the 2-digit SIC data. The dependent variable in all cases is the logarithm of the black/white-male
ratio of the number of businesses. Regressions using two samples are reported because eachsample
has its advantages. The first sample is the full sample, and the second excludes SIC's with fewerthan
500 black businesses and fewer thsn 10,000 white businesses. The fullsample suffers from some
measurement error in the right-hand-side variable because it is a group average, with the degree of
measurement error depending on the number of businesses. The subset of industries excludes the
most mismeasured observations, but introduces some bias because of truncation determinedby the
dependent variable. I do not expect that either bias will be pronounced, but as a check I have
reported both sets of estimates.
The regression estimates in Table 15 do not provide much support for either theliquidity
constraints or the consumer discrimination hypothesis. The coefficients on the starting capital
variables do not generally have the expected positive sign, and the minority customer coefficients do
not generally have the expected negative sign. The only coefficient that is of the expected sign and
almost significant is the white starting capital coefficient in Specification (2) for the fullsample. For23
these equations I also performed heteroskedasticity tests which failed to reject homoskedasticity in
8 of9cases by a wide margin.3'
Anadditional set of graphs examine if the effect of liquidity constraints and consumer
discrimination is more evident in the ratio of black to white-male net income by industry. Without
the micro data only a 1-digit SIC industry analysis can be presented. Figures 10 through 12 are
graphs analogous to those above, but they display relative net income rather than the relative number
of businesses. These graphs seem to fit the theories somewhat, with the starting capital graphs
showing the expected positive slope if one excludes transportation, and the minority customers graph
showing the expected negative slope.
8. Other Explanations
Several other explanations for the low rate of black entrepreneurship have been proposed.
Two of these explanations might be called the consumer demands explanation and the culture of
entrepreneurship explanation. Kinzer and Sagarin (1950). Glazer and Moynihan (1970), and Light
(1972) all describe special demands of various ethnic and racial groups that were served by
entrepreneurs from that group. Examples are exotic vegetables that Chinese immigrants sold to each
other, Kosher wine and matzos that Jewish entrepreneurs sold to other Jews, and pasta that Italians
sold to their former countrymen. These special consumer demands provided business opportunities
that were not easily filled by members outside the group. It is argued that blacks had very few special
consumer demands that could not be satisfied by white entrepreneurs.
There are several difficulties with this consumer demands theory. First, it does not explain
the success with which Chinese and Japanese immigrants seem to have been able to sell to those
31j regressed the square of the OI..S residuals on a constant and the variance in the dependent
variable obtained using unpublished CBO standard errors and the delta method.24
outside their group fairly soon after their arrival in the U. S.32 Second. businessescatering to
special consumer demands may provide a captive market, but it is a small one. Today such businesses
must make up an even smaller percentage than they did in the past. For this explanation to continue
today it requires a great deal of persistence in group entrepreneurship patterns.
The second explanation is that blacks have lacked a culture of entrepreneurship. Frazier
(1957) has talked about a lack of [black] traditions in the field of business enterprise." Glazer and
Moynihan (1970) have argued that as slaves, blacks did not have a tradition of managing money, and
that this has hindered attempts at entrepreneurship. Related to this argument is evidence suggesting
that many people learn about entrepreneurship from friends or relatives. The difficulty with this
explanation is that it can approach a tautology. The explsnation also requires these trends persist
over long periods of time, which may not be plausible given the high rate of small business turnover.
In a series of books and articles, Light33 has tried to add more substance to the Frazier
argument by describing cultural and class characteristics that aid entrepreneurship. He describes
informal capital markets, usually rotating credit associations, that aided entrepreneurshipamong
Chinese, Japanese and Korean immigrants. He also emphasizes ways that the tight knit nature of the
these groups supported entrepreneurship. Business development was aided by ethnic solidarity,
mutual support networks, nepotistic hiring, informal and formal restraints of trade, and language
barriers according to Light. He also argues that recent Korean immigrants came from a business
class.
There are important weaknesses to this cultural explanation. The capital market argument
does not seem likely to be crucial to small business. As we saw in SIPP and CBO data, large amounts
of capital generally are not need, and new businessman do not regularly borrow. Rotating credit
32See Light (1972), pp. 15-18.
33See Light (1972, 1979, 1984), Light and Bonacich (1988).25
associations tend to provide very short term loans, usually only lasting several months. Even Light's
own recent data on Los Angeles Koreans indicates that the vast majority of businesses are self-
linanced and do not rely on rotating credit associations. The other aspects of the cultural
explanation merit further study.
9.Conclusions
Theevidence here does not support the liquidity constraints/low assets explanation for the
low black self-employment rate. Black/white differences in net worth can only explain a small part
of the differences in their rates of business formation. Logit equations for who is self-employed in
a cross-section and who becomes self-employed in a panel suggest that net worth is not an important
determinant of the racial differences in self-employment. Little capital is needed to start most
business and beginning entrepreneurs do not usually borrow. Also, the industrial distribution of black
and white businesses does not indicate a greater relative representation of blacks in industries
requiring less starting capital.
This evidence should not be taken to imply that liquidity constraints are unimportant in the
establishment of large businesses. I have only examined their importance for the small businesses that
the vast majority of entrepreneurs own. However, entrepreneurs commonly begin with a small
business, build it up and sell it, and then enter a more capital intensive business.35 The rate of very
small business formation may be the key indicator of future business success.
I have also examined if black businesses are relatively more common in industries where white
customers more frequently patronize black businesses. The evidence does not support this form of
See Light and Bonacich (1984), pp. 254-259.
35See Light and Bonacich (1988), p. 243 who note this for Korean businesses in Los Angeles.26
consumer discrimination, but the conclusion is less definite. I conclude that cultural differences may
explain black white differencea in self-employment, but this explanation needs further study.27
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Oelf—employmant Rat.(0) 4.5 0.0 1.0 3.3 3.2 2.7
Notas: 01) flea oolf-omploymant rate is the p000antaaa of all thom.ooob 000 010 oreself
employed. (2) In the Canaos que.tionoalre, ondividoale are aekod to olaeeify theio ooooeot
job arlivity as employed hyoprioate company, employed by the 000eroment. self-employed,
or morkinsmithootpay in fanoly bo.oneee 00feom.If a pereon ho. more than one job, they
are aaked to desoribe the one at mhorhtheymocked the most boors last meek. the self
employed are ae bad to ohooaa be tmaor oembosinaaanot onrorpooated, cod ommhosinese
inoorporeted.03) Parsonsof Spanish origin oan be any rere.30
Table 2
Self-Employment Rates Calculated from Number of Busineas Owners 1982
Nonioinority Black Hispanic
Total Male Total Total Women
TotalNon-AgrioultureEmployed 97759851489078929284907562252142736136
Numberof Business Owners 112607397582910 3254612628083160031
Self-cmployment Rate(%) 11.5 15.5 3.5 4.7 7.4
Notes: (I) The self-employment tate is calculated as the number of business owners
divided by nonagricultural employment. (2) Number of business owners comes from
Nucci (1989). which relies on the 1982 Characteristics of Business Owners.
(3) Total nonagricultural employment is calculated by adding the number of employed
Armed Forces from the 1980 Census to the number of employed non-agriculrursl
civilians from the Handbook of Labor Statistics.
*31
Table3
Sslfomploymenn Ratesofthose 16 sod Older, by here, Othnioity andOar
1984 Penal of OIPP, Wave 0






















































































































































Notae: (1) The numbene are semple oounte not universe estimates. (2) The soople consists
of those who coot sore than five hours/week. CS) Persons of eponlsh origin ceo be any
rare.(4) Sndividuels ore olonsifiod es self—employed er employed on the hasos of ohere
they 000bed the most hours. (2) Those nvployed nIh side ho eioses ore prcoacily ooge and
salon aorbens, hut have none se lf-enploymont hours. (6) Otenderd erroro one in
parnntheees.32
Table4
Bombersad Bet Incomeof Bonnircoity Male, Black. and Hispanic Owned Businesses,
by 1—Digit SIC, 1982 Characteristics of Business Owners Oats
Bunker of flows Mean Bet Inaame
Bleck/ Riepanic/ Blank) Bispanirf
iflcite White WhiteWhite White White
Mule Blank Bisperlc Ratio RatioMale Black Hispanic Retia Ratio
Agniaulture 264443 3103 7640 0.0191.128265097708 11040 0.2910.435
Construation 943162 23081 26699 0.0240.02815960 i3759 15993 0.861i.001
Manufacturing 17461341714364 0,0240.023217363426 22239 0.1561.023
Transportation290338 24397 13153 0.0840.04913372 11215 12888 0.7300.038
WhnleeslsTrede14317436513023 0.0250020354R98680 16970 0.1630455
Retail Trade 1363656 64033 30274 0.0620.0432531B4772 i2Bi6 0.3060.032
Finance 49714314020 01123 0.032 0.022 324859947 00560 0.3060.502
Services 2549004 147253 99279 0.059 0.039 251808339 15972 0.3260.610
Bet Clussified531930 32709 24963 0.052 0.040 193708280 11186 0.4270.578
Totsl 0836665 330239 249141 2.049 2.035 224377923 14781 0.3530.509
Botes: (1) The nec, income numbers are bused en cutaorical responses to the queatisn What
wee ynur firm's 1982 net income (or lose) before Tanae? Bet lnname (or lose) is equal to
total inra less cparaning expenses.An uppronination tn the mean wee ceiroleted ueing the
midpoint of serb interval and 1.5 times the lower (upper) limit for the category unbounded
shove (below).(2) Ps rears classified as Sispanio can he of an y race.33
Table 5
Earnings of Full-time, Nonagricultural, Self-Employed and
Wage and Salary Workers, 16 and Over, by Race, Ethnicity and Sex,





Mean Earnings Cs) 22,862 16,564 16,380
(157.17) (336.02) (400.75)
Mean L,n(Earnings) (5) 9.8172 9.5232 9.5354
(0.0085) (0.0270) (0.0286)
Median Earnings (5) 20,493 15,120 14.364
Sample Size 8,540 759 511
Self -employed
Mean Earnings (5) 27,928 20,183 25,577
(833.70) (3,639.97) (4,423.65)
Mean Ln(Earnings) (5) 8.9963 8.8349 9.0345
(0.0823) (0.4785) (0.3511)
Median Earnings (5) 18,000 13,932 15,000
Sample Size 1,166 30 49
Females
Wage and Salary
Mean Earnings (5) 13,873 12,693 11.851
(109.07) (253.13) (386.11)
Mean Ln(Earnings) (5) 9.3070 9.2256 9.1555
(0.0121) (0.0315) (0.0460)
Median Earnings (5) 12,600 11,760 11,153
Sample Size 5,640 781 308
Self -employed
Mean Earnings (5) 9,909 5.719 11,015
(837.29) (1,026.70) (4,929.54)
Mean Ln(Earnings) (5) 7.0009 7.6421 7.5722
(0.1815) (0.5180) (0.8751)
Median Earnings (5) 4,662 3,675 5,940
Sample Size 344 23 12
Notes:(1) Full-time is define as at least 35 hours/week on all jobs.(2) Self-
employment income is from the question What was the total amount of income that
received from this business (Read each month)?"34
Table 6
Earnings Equations for Wage and Salary and Self-Employed Nonagricultural Workers,




























































































Region, Urban Dummies yes yes yes
Sample Size 17769 16166 1603
R-Square .2033 .2666 .1272
Notes: (1) Standard errors are inparentheses.(2) All equations include a
constant.(3) The omitted marital status group is never married.(4) Other race
includes Asians and Native Americans.36
Table 7
Receipts, Number of Employees, and Legal Form of Organization
Nonminority Male, Black, and Hispanic Owned Businesses
Nonminority Male Black Hispanic
Number of Firms 6,856,665 339,239 248, 141
Total Receipts ($1000) 399,841,88812,443,57214,976,337
Mean Receipts ($) 87,483 36,681 60,354
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Notes: (1) Receipts, number of employees, and form of organization come from the
categorical responses to the SHOBEROB Survey reported in the 080. Approximate
means were calculated for receipts and number of employees using the midpoint of
the intervals, and 1.5 times the lower limit for the category unbounded from above37
Table8
tastE Equations for Self Omployia.nE, Nananiacltur.l Workers 16 and Older,
1984Panel of SIP?, War.4
Specification
Variable
(5) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All All All White Black
0.0364810.054386 0.032446 0.0553450,000336
(0,00856?) (0.006469) (0,008418) (0.008757) (0.043056)
0.0756320.079307 0.084665 0.0829980,127046
(0.012228) (0.012071) 0.012109) (0.012440) (0,071668)
-'0.049280 -0.047455 —0.052625 —0.0093700.093044
(0.013406) (0.013214) (0.013271) (0.013619) (0.075842)
0.0241220.518407 0.517132 0.5363780.464222
(0.051580) (0.001304) (0.031303) (0.053290) (0.262641)
—0.917070 -0.906530 -0,925328
(0.127968) (0.127700) (0.127747)
—0,249764 —0.268038 -0,294318 -0.303532 -0.965612




(0,101463) (0.099090) (0.098741) (0.102726) (0.519498)
0.510975 0,3949940.389008 0,366733 0.754526
(0.119575) (0.116475) (0.115032) (0.101390) (0.547077)
0.1244820.120444 0.129222 0.139401 0.153686
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Sample Suae 22185 22185 22165 22185 19595 1999
Bctea: (1) A 1 cc cab-employed. (2) Standard errore arecparerthaeaa (3) Al).
equatinneincLude a cunetant. (4) The uncttad marital Status 8rcup i.e never married(5)
Other rare cnuLudee Aaians and Betive Anarcuane. (6) ALL cat worth vaniehiae era ic
S100000e, and axcluda businean aqucty ucleae uthareiea noted.39
TahleS
Loit Equations for Transitions to Self Employment, Nonaorioultorol Workers 16 and Older,
1984 Pae.l of SIPP
Sp.rifloation
Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (0) (6)
Waves andSample 4—7 All4-7All 47 All 47 All47 All49 All
Scareof Sdoration 0.066964 0.063997 0.0642720.069212 3.0656432067964
(0.024868) (0.024905) (0.024901) (0.024931) (0.025381) (2.024240)
Ma in Years 00083360.052986 0.0624000.068182 0.036756 0.003663
(0.037922) (0.036009) (0.337961) (0.039400) (0.036462) (0.034836)
Roe Squared/tOO -0.073884 —O.80439 -0.079711 —0.084330 —0.072961 —0.013527
(0.046010) (0.046177) (0.046136) (0.0478)8) (0.046900) (0.042142)
Male 0.584324 0.590616 0.5887910.594753 0.606290 0.495321
/0.142618) a.142784( (0.142749) (0.143246) (0.143225) (0.130603)
Slook —0.642393 —0.524118 -0.626023 —0.626718 —0.554838 —0.584310
(0.329305) (0.329517) (0.329305) (0.329632) (0.531136) (0.329255)
Hiaponio —0.110066 —0.094157 —0.090120 —0.098140 —0.101249 —0.459561
(0.335056) (0.535201) (0.330200) (0.335264) (0.030898) (0.368574)
Othor Rare —0.236406 —0.229032 —0.230026 —0.236)8) —0.206298 —0.6169)1
(0.423796) (0,423921) (0.423909) (0.424030) (0.428860) (0.461820)
Married with 0.425852 0.436660 0.4358940.459502 (.447008 0.520954
Spouse Present (0,21)260) (0.216310) (0.216154) (0.220148) (0.220947) (0.208233)
Previously Married, or0.032012 0.064174 0.060)9)0.072411 0.070786 0.420331
Spouse Sot Preeant (0.29457)) (0.290447) (0.290364) (0.297032) (0.500024) (0.273278)
6ter of Children —0.123656 —0.122962 —0.123000 —0.123345 —0.120054 —0.095580
Under 16 (0.065691) (0.066713) (0.058700) (0.068799) (0.058919) (0.063910)
Nit Worth (0100,000's) 0,040145
(With Bueinaee Equsty) (0.015720)
Net Worth )0100,000'e) 0.043493
(Minus Oueonass Equity) (0.016041)
Sat WorthaMe 16-04 0.090300
(0. 04 2006)
Net Worth5Me 35-54 0.006290
(0.0494 10)





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)










































Sample Sine 15296 13265 12296 12266 13296 12715
Nutae: (1) A 1 cc ealY—anplnyad. (2) Otandand erccnn are in pacenthenne, (2) All
equations include a constant. (4) The onitted nacitel etatoe snoop ie never aannied. (5)
Other Race cnclodee Aecane andNativeAmericana. (6) The net ,enrth vencablan are in
0100,000'eand exclude koeuneee equityooleeentterwiee noted. (7) The ahite tccneitcun
rate (atandard error) fcc Wave 4to7 ia .0192 (.0012) acidforWave 4 to 9 ie .0234
(.0014).41
tabI.10
AdditionalLo5it Equations for Transitions to 5.1! Employment,
8onororoLtora1 Wonton, 16 and Older
Sperifiostion
Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Waves said Sony).. 4-7 AlL4-9 AlL 47 White47 All47 ALL47 ALL
Yearsof idurstion 0.0626180.0924560.071031 0.0454700 090177 0.067309
(0.024843)(0.023733)(0.026042)(0.030794) (0.023053) (0.027746)
AgeinYears 0.0876830.0132300.1002950.0870810.094427 0.135626
(0.038033) (0.034434) (0.041381) (0.03838)) (0.038702) (0.043876)
AgeSqu.red/lOO -0.085007 -0.020338 -0.129496 —0.107863 —0.115392 —0.157804
(0.046304) (0.041537) (0.050848) (0.04t445) (0.047196) (0.053871)
MaLe 0.5890460.4769980.627389 0.6960)70.700279 0.900622
(0.142765) (0.130469) (0.149529) (0.162545) (0.154184) (0.173961)
Nlaok —0.644231 —0.731223 —0.361137 —0.6497480.838291
(0.329788) (0.328193) (0.333254) (0.331175) (0.403175)
8i.panio —0.103375 —0.4893630.140713 —0.0744900.084340 0.006943
(0.333498) (0.388148) (0.333613) (0,337148) (0.338190) (0.357416)
other Rare —0.233551 —0.603025 -0.055083 —0.292275 —0.127333
(0.404211) (0,460486) (0,426655) (0.431406) (0.436061)
Married mitt 0.432299 0.5714660.440333 0.5032100.549704 0.662109
Spouee Prsoent (0.207430) (0.003896) (0.225654) (0.219800) (0.219463) (0.235729)
Previously Married, or 0.0480400.343043 —0.1217860.0877070.1156320.060088
Spoue. Not Present (0.294763) (0.267260) (0.321341) (0.296639) (0.293284) (0.329567)
Number of ChiLdren -0.113543 —0.087970 —0.245673 —0.121013 —0.122996 —0.178842
Under 19. (0.068800) (0.063803) (0.072509) (0.089190) (0.069117) (0.077853)
9t Worth (2100,000'.) —0.396792 —0.498026 —0.341811 —0.328443 —(.2844010.037414
)Miouo 9u.cnees Equity) (0.271959) (0,254948) (0.276078) (0.272403) (0.273892) (0.298975)
Net Worth° 0.4384020.533429 0.3837990.369231 0.3359740.03)290
Top Net Worth Quartile ((.270381) (0.253532) (0.277497) (0.270721) (0.272108) (0.296788)
SamofCoefficients on0.041810 0.044903 5.0439890.240788 0.031573 0.068704
Last TwoVariables (0.016790)(0.015320) (0.016771) (0.017257) ((.006923) (0.019429)42
Veriebje Specification





















































Sample Sue, 13296 12715 11749 13296 13296 12671
Nntee: )1) See notee to Table 9.(5) The chute 'elf-employment rate (etenderd error) ton epecifucatlen)6) ue .0270 (.0012)
.3Logit Equotioos for Treneitione out of Self Employamnt.
Nonegricolturel Worker. 16 end 01d.r
Spooifirotion
(2) (3)








































































Notes: (10 All specification. includeanorstart. region irdiceturvecceblee, so
urbers indicator, end en indicstnr for other core which includes Aeieno end Betiv.
erirane.(21 Stezcdsrderror. are inperertheees. (3) Thedependent verieble
equeloon.if a person cc notionereslf-emplnyed, i.e.eithernot e.oployed, or
enployed ananene and celery unrier.(41 The eenple Eeclucer.te (standard error)
for column (01 and (2) in .3070 (.03051 end for rnlu (3) ie .2353 (.0343).44
Table 12
AmountofStartup Capital Needed, and Amount Borrowed,
for Norusinority Male, flack, and Hispanic Owned Businesses





None 25.5 30.7 26.8
$1 to $4,999 33.9 39.4 37.2
$5,000 to $9,999 10.9 8.2 12.1
$10,000 to $24,999 12.4 6.8 10.9
$25,000 to $49,999 6.1 2.6 4.2
$50,000 or more 5.8 1,9 2.9
Not Reported 5.5 10.5 5.8
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
Percentage of Capital Borrowed
No Capital Required 25.5 30.7 26.8
None 40.9 38.6 40.1
1 to 20 3.9 5.0 5.2
21 to 40 2.5 2.1 2.9
41 to 60 5.8 4.2 6.6
61 to 80 4.3 2.4 3.1
81 to 100 12.1 7.9 10.2
Not Reported 4.9 9.2 5.2
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
Notes: The startup capital needed comes from the question reported in the text.
The percentage of capital borrowed comes from the question "What percent of the
capital did you borrow?" which was asked of business owners who responded that the'r
needed at least $1 to start their business.45
Table 13
Sources of Borrowed Cspitsl and Sources of Equity Capital,
for Nonminority Male, Black, and Hispanic Owned Businesses,
1982 Characteristics of Business Owners
Percentage of Firms
White Male Black Hispanic
Sources of Borrowed Funds








Sources of Equity Capital
















Notes: (1) Numbers may sum to over 100 percent since multiple responses
are allowed. (2) Sources of borrowed funds comes from the question "From which of
the following sources did you borrow money to become an owner of this business?
Mark (x) all that apply." Sources of equity capital comes from the question "From
which of the following sources did you obtain EQUITY CAPITAL (not borrowed) to


















Number of Firms, Percentage of Businesses with Primarily Minority Customers.
Percentage roth Startup Capitol Less thor 05,000, for Blocke and Bonminoorty Moles,
2—Digit Industries, 1982 Chereoterretice of Nosiness Goner.
SICIndustryDesoription
Percent of Firma Pscnsnt of Firms
Numher of with C$5,000sith Primarily






9 Fishing, humtimg, end tcsppro
10 Metel monimg
11 docthrocite mining
12 Bituminous cosi acid lignite mining
13 OiL end gee smtcsctiom
14 BommotolLic mimacols, esnept fuels
15 General building cortroc tons
16 Reovy construction contcoctucs
17 Special toedscortcevtcrs
20 Food end kimdcsd pcuducts
22OsetiLeeiLLproducts
23 Appecsl end other temtile pccducte
24 lumber end wood products
25 Furniture endfietures
26 Pepsi sod ellied pccdurts
27 Printing end publishing
28 Chamicele end wIlled pcuduuts
29 Petroleum end cost products
30 Rubber end miscelleneous plastros
31 Leather end leather products
52 Stone, clay, end glese products
33 Primary metelindustries
34 Fehnrceted metal pooduots
30 Menhimery, escepteleutrical
36 Eieotciuei, elertrcncc equipoent
37 trensportetiom equopeent
38 Instruments end related products
39 MiscelLenwous menufecturing
00Rsilrsad trensportatirn
41 Local, imtsrurben pessenger trensit
42 Touching end mecshousrng
44 Water trueeportotrcn
45 Trensportetion by air
31034838827 0.04982.52
3101117900 0.026 80.11




























444 37263 0.012 78.04
340 0.000








































Percent of Firma Percent of Firma
Number of with 033,055 with Pcieoriiy
Boeinoeeea Bluckf Startup Capital. Minority Coatonero
________________Whit.___________________________________________
SlackWhit. RatioSlack White Black Whit.
46 Pipe linen, except natural gaa
47Traneporiution Service. 2219
49Cunicetieo 100
49El.ctnio, poe.andsanitary eaovica. 1391
SO Wholesale trad.—durakla goods 1027
51 Whole.ale trade-nondurable gooda 2247
52 Building neteciala, eard.n uupplieu529
33 Sen.ral aecohandisa store. 844
34 Food atone. 9027
50 Auttive dealers, eervio. utatioce 3192
36 Apperel. and accaaeory store. 2017
77 Furniture, bane furni.hcng.store. 1919
59Eating and drinking pIsces 12143
59 Miscall.aneoue retail 50715
60 Banking 221
61 Credit egecciee other than banks 20
62 Saourity and coanodoty brukece 90
43Insursncsoarr icr.
84 Insurance agent. and brokers
65Real estate
66 Cankinad real estate, insurance
67 Holding andothercnv.stn.nt officen
70 Butela and other lodging placen
72 Pernunal eervicse
73Bueineas eervicea
75 Auto repeir, aerciree, and gecagee
76 1'tincellanaoun repeor anrvccsn
78 Motion pictures






































2529 67107 0.738 86.93
322 2409 0.134
31744697657 0.046 63.60
324344 7584269 0.043 78.55
Notes (1) mean nunhere are dunoved Crow upero.l teboletione don. by the Center for tccconoc Studoee,












































































(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Full Sample:
Fraction of Black Boeineegee —0 1329 —0 5392 With0 23000Btarting Capital (0.8414) (0.9240)
Frartinn of Oflcite Biaineaeaa 0.6945 —0.2939
With n 05000 Starting Capital 04038) (14218)
Fraction of Blrri Buninraree 0.0454 0.1511 —0.0147 Witi uSitMinorityCustorern (0.6809) (0.6010) (0.6936)
Positionof WhiteBueioercee —0 2880
With u505Minority Cuntonece (0 0306)
Sample Sirs 36 51 26 24 26 26
Redur.d Sample:
Fraction of SInk Bueoneenee 0.1048
With 0 $5000 Btrrting Capital (0.6317)
Fraction of White Buaoneeoee —0.li2B
With 0 23000 Starting Capitil 00.3879)
Fraction of Blank Boninaeeae
With 0 50% Minority Cuetonera
Fraotioc of White Borirgeree 0.0312
With 0 50% MInority Customgce (0 4517)
Sample Sire 34 34 22
Botee: 01) The depondent vnriahlr is tha log of thr ratio of the nunher of blaok owned
boninaee.s in the 2—digit SIC to the nuniac of white male owned iceineneen on thot
icduatry. All empleoatory van ahlen arson logo. (2) ma reduced canple ooneocte of only
three2dogit 51Cr on nhioh the nurthrr of blurB bueineeeee inat least 000 and tha number
ofchits male husoceeree inn bent 10,000.(3) ma Cull eamplo and redoosd eamnplan are
the same for np0000icrtioca 3, B, and 0. (4) All equations include a ornetect. (5)
Standard scrorn era inperenthanen.Figure 1
Black/ White Ratio of NumberofBusinesses, for 1-Digit Industries
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Figure 2
Black/ White Ratio of Number of Businesses, for 2-Digit Industries







B 8we.6I, 508508 C..C158Figure 3
Blactc/ White Ratio of Number of Businesses, for 2-Digit Industries,
Excluding SIC 41















S o— U 24
75
0234 • • 179U7
55• 27 1551 U II
537: 9 U •23 5 U
01 0.9 01
Pe70147441 77 04 3,.,,r t5 55,23 Coo51
Figurei
Black/ White Ratio of Number of Businesses, for 2-Digit Industries
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Black/ White Ratio of Number of Businesses, for 2-Digit Industries,
Excluding SIC 41
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Figure6
Black/WhiteRatio of Number of Businesses, tori -Digit Industries
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Black!White Ratio of Number of Businesses, for 2-Digit Industries
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Figure 8
Black / White Ratio of Number of Businesses, for 2-Digit Industries
Excluding SIC 41
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Black/ White Ratio of Number of Businesses, for 2-Digit Industries
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Figure 10
Black / White Ratio of Mean Net Income, for 1-Digit Industries
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BlackI WhiteRatioofMean Met Income, for 1-Digit Industries
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Figure12
Black/ White Ratio of Mean Net Income, for1-Digit Industries













M, C 14.1*65 01* e,. NA 6 e65 III